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Excesses of Conduct: Cultural Biopolitics in IS Media

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In recent years, the group known as the Islamic State (IS) have skilfully produced and coordinated a successful media apparatus which helped to fortify a caliphate. The reach of IS's media has both local and global concentrations and includes an uptake of one-to-many (videos, magazines, songs) and many-to-many media (blogs, social networks). While there has been a focus on the representative messages of IS media as propaganda, little work has been done on the production and regulation of internal citizens and external supporters' daily conduct in terms of processes of subjectification; less has been done on IS's

deployment of power. In light of an analysis of IS videos such as *End of Sykes-Picot* (2014) and *No Respite* (2015), I argue that IS media exerts biopower in that it teaches who to 'make live' or 'let die' (Foucault, 2003, p. 241). Here, biopolitical deployment must be considered beyond a strictly scientific sense: IS do not solely rely on the scientific disciplines to capture, analyse, manage, foster, and exclude life. Instead, biopower in IS media refers rather to a cultural biopolitics (Blencowe, 2011): IS media teaches subjects what kind of daily conduct is required for the pursuit of salvation. By linking biopower with Foucault's concept of governmentality, we can then begin to delineate how IS subjects are biopolitically cultivated through material and media apparatuses.

Foucault describes biopower and biopolitics interchangeably as a technology of power with the capacity to 'make live' or 'let die' (2003, p. 242). Biopower operates through a racialised norm to which the population is measured against, thus formulating whose lives are liveable or not. Subjects are then discursively produced in terms of their worth and utility to the social body which is 'a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls' (Foucault 2003, p. 254). In this way, biopower becomes a logic of governance that seeks to produce healthy bodies where possible and relegate unliveable subjects to the status of exclusion or death. As Foucault claims, biopower does not necessarily eclipse other technologies of power, such as that of discipline. Rather, it does 'dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in disciplinary techniques' (Foucault 2003, p. 242). In IS media, it is then worth considering the presence of biopower, disciplinary power, and pastoral power. That is, to garner a sufficient understanding of the governmental function of IS media that is communicated in media and which was corporeally acted upon, we must consider assemblages of multiple technologies of power.

The simultaneity of power in IS media governance, I argue, helps to constitute what Claire Blencowe has called cultural biopolitics (2011, p. 139). Blencowe's claim is a reaction to Nikolas Rose's (and more widely, Paul Rabinow's) focus on the molecular capacity of biopolitics rather than one that focuses on cultural conduct (2011, p. 127). Blencowe suggests that 'population life may have been refigured in cultural economic terms rather than having disappeared in the era since the molecular revolution in biological science', and that 'biopolitical racism... might operate today in the experiential economy of cultural politics' (2011, pp. 128-128). This line of reasoning, as Blencowe claims, is to consider a shift from a biological to a cultural racism and is 'not to suggest that biological racism is dead and buried' (2011, p. 142). When one looks across IS's media and its previously extant practices of governance, a strong case for a juvenile mode of cultural biopolitics can be made. Preliminarily, we can say that the ways in which IS govern, which is prevalent in their media and overarching governmentality, relies on a system of inclusion and exclusion that is informed by correct cultural conduct; rehabilitation measured against a norm to produce desirable subjectivities in cases of deviance;

internalised and automatic techniques of self-correction; ritualised self-reflection, and so on. A cultural biopolitics, in the case of the Islamic State, then places the soul at stake in the conduct of the body. In IS media, a cultural biopolitics which subsumes disciplinary and pastoral techniques is deployed; this technique of governance seeks to regulate cultural conduct by imbuing a subject as worthy of life or death (exclusion). In this conception, the cultural conduct of the populace stands in for a racialised subjectivity in which lives can be fostered at the individual level through rehabilitation, and subsequently fostered to form a 'healthy' population of good Muslims in order to build an Islamic pastorate.

This essay analyses arrangements of power in IS media I consider to be characteristic of the group's larger media apparatus. I examine three modalities of media: videos produced by official IS production companies, the official IS online magazine *Dabiq* which has since been replaced by *Rumiyah*, and the now defunct Tumblr account 'PaladinOfJihad'. In the first section I discuss videos produced by IS as functional terror apparatuses that seek to regulate life both inside and outside the caliphate. Because it is outside the scope of this article to give an in-depth analysis of a vast sum of videos that have been produced by IS, I have chosen two significant types of videos that are characteristic of the spectrum of IS video apparatuses. Namely, I focus on the biopolitical function of such videos to flesh out practices of IS governmentality and conduct. While primarily biopolitical, the terror apparatus video can also function as a pedagogical knowledge object which educates who must be excluded or killed in both a literal and Foucauldian sense (2003, p. 256). Such videos operate within an IS episteme that seeks to impart new conditions for the possibility of knowledge; in particular, knowledge of correct conduct for healthy bodies and healthy souls. In the second section, I reflect on the presence and deployment of multiple technologies of power in *Dabiq*. That is, I consider the re-constitution of power in which at particular points in *Dabiq*, aspects of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower converge. This was a key tenet of IS's dispositif of terror and, as I argue, accounts for an efficacy of subjectification with religious appropriation as its backbone. Like the terror apparatus video, *Dabiq* functions as an epistemic authority through its status as an 'official' knowledge object. The final section of this article examines the unofficial Tumblr accounts of IS supporters and members as constitutive of a larger apparatus of terror. Tumblr blogs can be considered as an extension of power as unofficial blogs are examples of media that is both consumed and produced by IS supporters. In many ways, the prosumed media of IS accounts for the automatic functioning of disciplinary power (Foucault 1995 [1975], p. 176) to the extent that the subject creates their own gaze for future subjects to internalize. These blogs account for subjectivities that IS have helped to produce through their intent to spread specific messages and the accounts themselves seek to produce particular subjects. A prime focus of this section is the role of social media in educating subjects on how to perform hijrah. For IS, this performance simultaneously became a biopolitical act as it fostered the health of the caliphate's population

on one hand, and enabled both pastoral and disciplinary compliance in hijrah's framing as a religious duty on the other. Specifically, I discuss the now defunct tumblr account of PaladinOfJihad and his blog series #DustyFeet that instructed subjects on how to enact hijrah and the state of living in the caliphate on arrival during 2015.

The Biopolitical Video Apparatus

Media produced by IS addresses those both internal and external to the caliphate. In understanding the regularising function of the terror apparatus video, I follow Allen Meek's claim about biopolitical media: 'Media images function on economies of production and consumption that define individuals and groups in terms of social, political, and biological inclusion and exclusion, health and sickness, productivity and waste' (2016, p. 31). In other words, the primary goal of the following videos that I discuss is to split groups into who can live and who can die. Lines of 'race' are then constituted by cultural difference to the preferred IS Muslim subject. Such lines of race are informed by power/knowledge(s) whose goal is to foster normal subjectivities and exclude abnormal ones. In this segregation of liveable from unliveable lives, a racial grammar is crucial in establishing fixed cultural differences. However, as will become clear in the discussion on *Dabiq*, the treatment of subjects does not solely rely on an us/them distinction: in many cases, we find a typology of how to be included and excluded on either side of the binary; the treatment of racially defined subjects by IS can vary depending on the specific subject.

No Respite was produced in 2015 by IS's Al-Hayat Media Center who mainly target Western, English-speaking audiences (Farwell 2015, p. 49) and functioned largely as an advertisement for the caliphate. At its opening we are given bibliographical information about the caliphate: 'It was established in the year 1435 Hijri'; 'Its leader from the tribe of Kuraysh, is Shaykh Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi'; 'Its territory is already greater than Britain, eight times the size of Belgium ...' (*And No Respite* 2015). The claims to its establishment, its leader, and its size, all serve as markers of legitimacy for the Islamic State. Yet the main point of the video is its biopolitical narrative: its objective is to produce an us/them binary that defines friends and enemies in terms of biopolitical exclusion informed by a bio-culturally produced paradigm. IS understands differences in subjectivity in terms of cultural disparity which exemplifies Foucault's conception of a racialised norm. The biopolitical narrative of *And No Respite* is laid out by delineating a typology of enemies that are not adherents to the preferred IS subjectivity. A voiceover that runs throughout the video describes the caliphate and outlines a variety of kinds of enemies:

Its estate, built on the prophetic methodology, striving to follow the Qur'an and Sunnah, not a secular state built on man-made laws, whose soldiers fight for the interests of taghut [tyrant or oppressor] legislators {close-up of Obama}, liars {close-up of Bush}, fornicators {close-up of Bill Clinton}, corporations {overlay of major corporations' logos}, and for the freedom of sodomites {close-up of hand holding

a phone with the news headline 'ISIS LGBT Persecution: At UN Security Council Meeting, Gay Islamic State Victims in Syria and Iraq Discussed'. (And No Respite 2015)

Though the focus is on US politicians and corporations, it is understood that secular legislation, liars, fornicators, and the LGBTQI community in general are not included within the preferred IS subjectivity: they are disposable. These populations could adhere to IS subjectification, though that would mean significant shifts in conduct and dissolving their own identities. As such, these identities constitute them as aleatory bodies, as they also have the potential to circulate insurgent information (such as that about sexuality, foreign policy, etc.) that accounts for resistance toward IS. This is certainly more likely to occur outside the caliphate than within it. The risk for punishment inside the caliphate is often too great to enact adverse forms of resistance, for if IS deems these groups un-governable or un-conductable, they then become biopolitically separated from a preferred IS subjectivity. In the Islamic State, this means both social and bodily death.

The above list is also constitutive of both pedagogy of correct conduct and a biopolitical strategy to separate subjects into those who are allowed to live or die. It is informed by an interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence whose obligations are to please Allah through the populace's conduct. Subjects of IS become objects as they experienced re-constituted technologies of power delivered via media and informed by claims to a religious episteme: to be allowed in al-Baghdadi's Islamic pastorate and consequently the divine pastorate of Jannah, the subject must self-police sexual desires, the temptation of secular legislation, lying, and the unjust pursuit of capital, even as the possibilities for these forbidden practices are actively presented to them as qualifications for possible identities.

Although it is not elaborated on in *No Respite*, there is certainly a discourse around the performance of health that informs a biopolitics of IS conduct in which healthy bodies produce healthy souls. This concern with health is largely prevalent in abstaining from particular foods and the consumption of Halaal meat since it is ritualised in Islam (al-Qaradawi 1999, pp. 41-69). The conduct discussed above should be motivated by the individual's desire for salvation by adhering to the rules of the flock and by disciplining oneself into particular cultural practices to avoid exclusion. The production of this conduct via a re-constitution of power is informed by an Islamist episteme that dictates the production of knowledge for IS. In addition, by producing subjects through media apparatuses and via praxis within the caliphate, the Islamist episteme underpinning IS's dispositif of terror then comes to dictate not just *what* can be counted as knowledge, but also *who* can be a knower and *who* can be known. Through the re-circulation of IS knowledge in western media, IS then stand as a proxy for a generalised knowledge of Islam which obscures other forms of Islamic power/knowledge that could contest their legitimacy.

In *No Respite*, immediately following the proclamations of who IS are not, proud declarations ensue that teach viewers, subjects, and enemies what is correct conduct for an IS mujahid or civilian:

We are men, honoured with Islam, who climbed its peaks to perform Jihad, answering the call to unite under one flag. This is the source of our glory, our obedience to our Lord. We are uncompromising in our call to tawhid [oneness with Allah]; we only bow to Allah. Unlike the countless deviant factions raising their false banners, and changing with the winds of jame politics. Yes, we are the soldiers who stomped the idols of nationalism, demolished the shirki symbols of Palmyra and Minoa, and destroyed the Sykes-Picot borders, for there is no honour to be found in the remnants of shirk and nationalism. (*And No Respite* 2015)

No Respite is then a video that simultaneously informs future citizens of the caliphate of their identities while creating a biopolitical caesura that splits populations into who can live and die (Pugliese 2013). What is the correct conduct for a soldier of the mujahedeen or civilian of the caliphate? It is the performance of jihad through violence and conduct; it is the embodiment of strict Islamic teachings; it is a claim to both tawhid and legitimate religious practice; it is obedience to divine law; and it is the dissolving of man-made national borders. Observers and adherents of these modes of governance and self-governance can be made to live as they exist on the 'normal' side of IS's biopolitical caesura. Conversely, subjects on the other side of this biopolitical split can be left to die. From the quotation above, we see that this group is made up of three primary categories: patriots, worshippers of other religions, and those who shirk their duties to Islam. These groups are categorised broadly on the side of the biopolitical split that would let them die. However, across other IS terror apparatuses such as *Dabiq* which I discuss below, we witness a typology of abnormality in which different kinds of dissidents are exposed to death in different ways. In considering the biopolitics of the terror apparatus videos, it is constructive to flesh out the leveraging of biopolitical knowledge as it pertains to sovereignties.



Figure 1 - <https://videopress.com/v/mjRqqqAP>



Figure 2 - <https://videopress.com/v/mjRqqqAP>



Figure 3 - <https://videopress.com/v/mjRqqqAP>

In a discussion of the biopolitical function of IS terror apparatuses, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the competition for biopolitical sovereignty between states, namely the US and IS. As a means of regulating US soldiers as a population that is exposed to death, IS appropriate American veteran suicide and mental health statistics as a means of biopolitical delineation:

America, you claim to have the greatest army history has ever known. You may have the numbers and weapons but your soldiers lack the will and resolve, still scarred from their defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. They return dead ... or suicidal ... (*And No Respite* 2015)

The claims to deaths and suicides of US soldiers are heard alongside figures 1, 2, and 3. The statistics used seek to leverage a biopolitically located racial difference between mujahid and US soldiers. These statistics assert a physical and mental weakness that can be closely

associated with shirk in the context of the video as, in the case of IS, the demarcation of subjectivities always stems from the will to IS Islamic subjectification. The deployment of these statistics harks back to Ali Fisher's account of IS's compliance in netwar, a low-intensity kind of information war, in that they embody the 'fusion of informational and physical aspects of conflict' (Fisher 2015, p. 5). By marking out the dead and the suicidal, IS attempts to portray the US army as incapable of participating in combat on one hand, and seeks to protect the life of its caliphate citizens on the other by portraying disavowed conduct. The quest for sovereignty over minds, lands, and bodies is pursued by IS not just via the corporeal removal of life from subjects, but also through the attempt to subordinate populations and subjects via the regularisation of life's potential. By marking out the dead and the suicidal, IS attempts to portray the US army as incapable of participating in combat on one hand, and seek to protect the life of its caliphate citizens on the other by outlining disavowed conduct.

IS and borders

Preceding a discussion of *Dabiq*, it is imperative to first draw on another readily available and heavily circulated video: *End of Sykes-Picot* (2014). *End of Sykes-Picot* is both an artefact and event in the IS narrative. This is because it showcases the group's overall goals and rationale and enacts them by excluding aleatory bodies. *End of Sykes-Picot* portrays the aftermath of IS's capture of a border patrol facility located between Iraq and Syria and is noteworthy for its prison scene. The host of the video opens a locked door to show a room full of prisoners who all embody abnormal subjectivities: 'some of them are Shi'a, some of them murtaddin, some of them are Yazidi' (*End of Sykes-Picot* 2014). The climax in this video is the controlled demolition of the police station at the border facility¹. According to the host's proclamation from earlier in the video, IS are 'exploding all government buildings' (*End of Sykes-Picot* 2014). The disciplinary removal of ill-performing Shi'a and 'devil-worshipping' Yazidis speaks to IS's overall goal of monotypic conduct within the caliphate. Shi'a and Yazidi interpretations of Islam are incongruous with IS and therefore must be removed from the caliphate forcibly. However, the destruction of Syrian and Iraqi federal buildings embodies IS's mission as a state-building exercise as well. That is, by doing away with previous structures that sought to control space, like border patrol centres, IS produce new modes for conducting bodies. In other words, to build a caliphate, IS had to remove the non-IS conduct-directing buildings of Iraqi and Syrian governments to allow for new structures that attempt to control behaviour.

Certainly IS's is, in many ways, a postcolonial project that is partly a reaction to the Sykes-Picot agreement: it is their wish to erase borders as they are man-made and inherently bound to nationalism. Yet, in their pursuit of the removal of geographical borders on earth is the enforcement of borders between subjects and subjectivities that are culturally located in the conduct of states and individuals. That is, IS

split populations according to cultural conduct that produce and enforce corporeal borders (Kamaloni 2016). In a chapter discussing racial politics in airports, Sunshine Kamaloni conceives of borders as not just splitting countries and therefore groups via a system of inclusion and exclusion, but also functioning corporeally to 'create and reflect difference ... between us and them, insiders and outsiders' (2016, p. 81). In airports, the abnormal body (argued by Kamaloni to be non-white, often a black body) is a threat to normal-bodied populations: it is a contamination risk. By regularising bodies and conduct within airports, risks to the population are managed. Likewise, in the Islamic State: bodily borders are produced by conducting the population through media artefacts which aim to direct the behaviour of subjects by portraying normal and abnormal subjectivities. While IS dissolve geographical borders, they simultaneously seek to bolster borders of the body that inform a binary of normal and abnormal. Pugliese's notion of geocorpography, 'the violent enmeshment of the flesh and blood of the body within the geopolitics of race, war and empire' (2007, p. 1), is elucidating here. Despite the dissolution of the Syrian-Iraqi border, IS attempt to socially order bodies by racialising culture and conduct. This is apparent in the video as a whole yet is most visceral in the climactic explosion of the border patrol facility. This event is the geocorpographical moment in the video: though the excluded bodies are not directly visible, the suggestion that these bodies were at least removed and may have been blown up as a means of exclusion par excellence marks the moment of political striation on the body via race and war. For IS, the secular border is abolished while the border of the body is bolstered and becomes further entwined with the racial, the political, and the violent. Unlike earthly borders, as we shall see in *Dabiq*, bodily borders are only ever ruptured at the neck or the wrist.




Figure 4 - The Concept of Imamah (Al-Hayat Media Center, Dabiq Issue1, 2014)

Dabiq

Throughout *Dabiq*, which was IS's primary English magazine until its pivotal re-manifestation as *Rumiyah*, convergences of power can primarily be seen through a lens of pedagogy which teaches subjects 'how to be a good Muslim.' The teaching of correct conduct firstly appears in the reappropriation of hadith and sura from the Qur'an. An example of pastoral power in the first issue is the five-part article, 'The Concept of Imamah (leadership)' (Al-Hayat, 2014, Issue 1, pp. 20-29). Undoubtedly, the imagery of a pasture evokes the shepherd and flock metaphor used in Foucault's exposition of pastoral power. For Foucault, pastoral power is a kind of power that manifests in religion (Christianityⁱⁱ in particular although references are made to pre-Christian religions, as well as Judaism and 'Eastern' religions) (Foucault 2007). Pastoral power follows the analogy of the shepherd and their flock of sheep in which the flock is solely under the care of the shepherd. There are three main factors that compose the early functionality of the pastoral mode of power as it was utilised by the Churches: pastoral power was applied over a demarcated group of people that were not necessarily in a fixed location, the selfless redemption of the flock was the shepherd's primary duty, and although it was his duty to ensure the individual salvation of the flock, he was also responsible for the flock as a whole (Golder 2007, p. 165). The significance of pastoral power to IS is apparent in the hierarchical

relationship between sovereign-pastor al-Baghdadi on one hand, and his subjects on the other. That is, as in the pastorate, al-Baghdadi is the pastor over his IS flock:

In a word, this metaphor of the shepherd, this reference to pastorship allows a type of relationship between God and the sovereign to be designated, in that if God is the shepherd of men, and if the king is also the shepherd of men, then the king is, as it were, the subaltern shepherd to whom God has entrusted the flock of men and who, at the end of the day and the end of his reign, must restore the flock he has been entrusted with to God. (Foucault 2007, p. 123)

The final part of this quotation exposes another fundamental aspect of pastoral power, the idea that the shepherd must at some time return the flock to God. This can only occur through correct conduct: that is, the correct governance of the flock and the self. However, this mode of power and its techniques are not limited to specific religious rituals. Pastoral power relies on correct daily conduct so that the subject can be admitted to heaven. Within the circulation of pastoral power the sovereign's duty is to redeem his people from damnation in the immediate world whereas the shepherd's was to deliver them safely to the next (Penttinen 2000, p. 211). I would argue that in the case of the Islamic State, pastoral power is arrived at in both of these forms.

The quotations from the second part of the article 'The Concept of Imamah' further exemplify the deployment of pastoral power. The first quote used in this section of the article (Fig. 4) is a testimony to pastoral techniques: 'Indeed every man is a shepherd and every shepherd is responsible for his flock. So the imam of the people is a shepherd and he is responsible for his flock' (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq* Issue 1, 2014, p. 22). The direct relation to pastoral power here is in the assurance of downward continuities in the governance of the caliphate. That is, if the state has upward continuity through the sovereign's ability to properly govern themselves and their own property, then it is guaranteed downward continuity through subjects' knowledge of how to govern their own flocks, such as fathers and their families for Foucault, as well as the subject's knowledge of how to individually conduct themselves (Foucault 2007, p. 94). The content of this section of the article is certainly a plea for *Dabiq's* audience to give themselves over to their leader, al-Baghdadi, to give bay'ah, an 'oath of allegiance' to a spiritual leader (Sourdél and Sourdél-Thomine 2007, p. 24).

This article feeds into the pedagogy of IS's interpretative teaching of a very specific Islamist hermeneutics and such articles are essential in constituting any apparatus of terror. The role of teaching is emphasised in the third part of the article, 'The Commands of Allah to Ibrahim', where the authors cite Islamic scholars and sura from the Qur'an concerning the creation of Ibrahim as an imam (pastor) for humanity (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2014, Issue 1, p. 26). In addition to this, the reader is also told how to use the word kalimat, the divine decree of Allah, and in what contexts it is permissible. Although this example of how to use words and concepts within IS Islamic teachings is

somewhat rudimentary, it is important to outline a lesson such as this as it encompasses the minute detail which the authors go into in the attempt to develop a population of good Muslims. This article sets up the basis for the rest of the content in *Dabiq* that enact assemblages of pastoral power, disciplinary power and biopower. Rather than merely utilising one kind of power, such as that of churches, in order to control the conduct of the populace, IS simultaneously exert all three modes of power, via both mediated and ontic forms of terror and governance, in the pursuit of both the caliphate and the control of its populace. Indeed, statements such as 'by Allah's permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master ... anyone who dares to offend him will be disciplined, and any hand that reaches out to harm him will be cut off' (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2014, Issue 1, p. 8) enact congregations of power. Such constellations are imperative to the construction and regulation of the caliphate, insofar as they allow conduct to be directed with a greater degree of efficiency than would the prioritisation of a single mode of power. By focussing on the biological privileging of one 'race' of good Muslims over another, or internalising surveillance within subjects for governmental control rather than religious gains which the populace may see as beneficent for themselves, the Islamic State came to be in control of great swathes of land in Iraq and Syria until late in 2017.

The theme of IS Muslim unity that runs through *Dabiq* is complicit in constellations of power that are fundamental to the functionality of terror apparatuses. Content in *Dabiq* that is key to achieving such unity is principally seen in articles which detail the unification of tribes within the caliphate and reports of bay'ah. Incidences of bay'ah that are reported in *Dabiq* are worth noting as they are indispensable in forming the pastoral caliphate in which disciplinary power and biopower can be exerted. This is because 'pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the individuals of the flock, it goes in search of those that have strayed off course, and it treats those that are injured' (Foucault 2007, p. 127). Through pledges of allegiance, new subjects come to be under the care of IS: they are cared for, disciplined, and their lives are fostered. Bay'ah is then imperative for the growth and construction of the caliphate. Further, compliance through baya'ah itself can also be read as an exertion of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower. This compliance is apparent in the unification of the flock, the production of subjects who conduct themselves in a particular way, and through the inclusion of some groups and exclusion of others from the governance of the caliphate.

A narrative of bay'ah which is present throughout most issues of *Dabiq* begins in the first issue. The first article, 'Halab Tribal Assemblies' is a testimony of a variety of bay'ah from tribes within the caliphate. Following a series of claims of allegiance to IS, we begin to see statements that enact modes of power. Among these are a list of statements which detail some of the benefits of being cared for by IS which include 'The state of security and stability enjoyed by the areas under the Islamic State's authority'; 'Ensuring the availability of food products and commodities in the market, particularly bread'; and

'Preparing lists with the names of orphans, widows and the needy so that zakah (zakat) and sadaqah can be distributed to them' (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2014, Issue 1, pp. 13-14). The first of these statements is the exertion of power through the care of the population. It connotes safety for the flock under rules imposed by IS, the authority of IS which informs the security and stability of the state is dictated by the production of correct conduct. The second statement invokes the fostering of life through the deliverance of food to sustain the people of the caliphate. The final statement echoes the sentiment of the second one but expands on it. The distribution of zakah and sadaqah, or charity (Sourdél and Sourdél-Thomine, 2007, p. 149), is the enforcement of life on those who, while not necessarily abnormal, are certainly marginalised. However, the final statement needs to be understood in the context of *Dabiq* and more widely, IS.

From the actions reported on in western media and enacted in IS video media, we must assume that the orphans and widows who are being cared for by the state are most certainly IS-Muslims; non-IS Muslim orphans and widows can surely not expect to receive charity in the caliphate. To receive charity, these marginalised groups must correctly conduct themselves as good Muslims in the eyes of IS. To gain access to the biopolitical technologies that foster life, all members of the population must believe correctly and behave correctly. The conduct of the population is also about fulfilling the interpretation of religious doctrine: in order to be admitted to heaven, the populace must conduct themselves in particular ways. This is achieved through direct statements made by IS and rationalised through the deployment of a specific Islamist hermeneutics which enact technologies of power. The theme of unity that grounds the correct conduct of the population is interwoven with the teaching of how to be a good Muslim. The subjects addressed in *Dabiq*, however, are not limited to those who reside inside the caliphate and this is why IS media constitutes an important part of the group's apparatus of terror: they served as an interlocutor between IS and their subjects and sought to regulate the conduct of those both inside and outside the caliphate.

A pedagogy of pastoral power reaches its' height in the sixth issue of *Dabiq*, 'Al- Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within'. One of the central points of this issue is the teaching of both the internal and external mujahedeen, those involved in jihad (Sourdél & Sourdél-Thomine 2007, p. 118). A congregation of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower appears in the article, 'Advice for the Soldiers of the Islamic State'. The tenth point in a series of authoritative statements made in the article by Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, a successor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when IS was still known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), underscores the relations of power inside the caliphate:

Break your inner self when it craves something, for not everything that one craves should be sought after. {Indeed, the soul is a persistent enjoiner of evil} [Yusuf: 53]. Take up fasting and you will be granted chastity. In summary, control your desires and be austere with your inner self concerning that which is not permissible for you.

And being austere with one's inner self is to be balanced concerning that which it loves or hates. (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015c, Issue 6, p. 8)

The first sentence from this quotation connotes an enforcement of disciplinary power. Its instruction is to initiate self-control in subjects so that they conduct themselves in a particular way and is similar to how Foucault accounts for the internalised surveillance of prisoners that is the primary goal of the Panopticon: 'to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power' (Foucault 1995, p. 201). The statement, 'Break your inner self when it craves something, for not everything that one craves should be sought after' (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015c, Issue 6, p. 8), is concerned both with the production of a correctly behaving subject and the rehabilitation of any such subject who might deviate from correct conduct.

In addition, this first statement is strengthened by the mobilisation of a quotation from the Qur'an. Following this is an order to fast and abstain from sex. These instructions for correct conduct are formations of both biopower and pastoral power. It is the intersection of these two modes of power that are viewable here. Abstaining from overindulgence in food and sex is productive for the state in that their avoidance allows for a healthier populace: lean, able-bodied, and without venereal infection. The effect is doubled to include pastoral power as, due to the uptake of a religious subjectivity from the perspective of IS, abstaining from particular foods and sexual activity is key for the health of the religious soul too. This lesson harks back to Foucault's signposting of the management of endemics in *SMD* (2003). Managing ongoing endemics facilitated the development of biopolitical initiatives, as a form of population control, in distinction to the previous treatment of sudden-death causing epidemics. Under a new biopolitical regime, endemics were categorised as phenomena that 'sapped the population's strength, shortened the working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they led to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive' (Foucault, 2003, p. 244). For IS then, endemics are bound to the health of both the body and the soul. Endemics in the caliphate pertain to risk management of conduct. Biopower aims to control and limit any deviance that would put the population at risk. Again, such endemics in the caliphate entail diet and sexual conduct which affect the health of the body and the religious soul. Given that IS's ideology stems from an interpretation of Qur'anic lessons, the regularisation of both food and sex is connected to correct daily conduct so that the imam may deliver each individual subject back to Allah. In terms of the population, 'the public good is essentially obedience to the law, either to the earthly sovereign's law, or to the law of the absolute sovereign, God' (Foucault 2007, p. 98). In this case, teaching correct daily conduct is an enactment of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower.



Figure 5 - Hadd for 8 Shabbihah (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq* Issue 2, 2014b, p. 31)



Figure 6 - Group Repentance of Sahwah Fighters in Al-Khayr (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq* Issue 3, 2014c, p. 17)

The primary objective of pedagogy in *Dabiq* can also be seen to mark out who must be killed. Images of trophy bodies are a common trope in *Dabiq* that simultaneously manifest pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower. The captions of images of trophy bodies belonging to deceased Shi'a soldiers are necessary to teach the reader who should be punished. In Figure 5 from Issue 2, subjects are being punished for hadd, crimes against God (Sourdél & Sourdél-Thomine 2007, p. 56). Their labelling as shabbihah apostates marks them as subjects to be killed: they have not performed correct conduct in the caliphate and cannot be rehabilitated so their lives must end.

Trophy bodies can also be used as examples of rehabilitation and allegiance rather than merely punishment. In Issue 3 (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2014c, p. 17), we see an example of docile trophy bodies (Fig. 6) with a caption that reads: 'Group repentance of Sahwah fighters in Al-Khayr.' This image, which echoes Bentham's Panopticon, reports that a range of subjects have repented and will maintain the norm of the caliphate. The image of this report suggests a rehabilitation of abnormal subjects inside the caliphate. Further, these subjects are learning how to conduct themselves correctly, so that they may function normally and have the same life-fostering benefits that other normal subjects who reside inside the caliphate have. Through the fostering of life, these subjects will now have the opportunity to conduct themselves correctly in their daily lives so that they may be admitted to heaven. The use of trophy bodies may also serve as a pedagogical exercise that shows who must be killed. The fourth issue of *Dabiq* reinforces a narrative of trophy bodies that is intertwined with guidelines of who to kill. The article titled 'The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour' (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015b, Issue 4, p. 14) is a key example of demarcating subjects and marking out who must live and who must die. As outlined in the article:

Their creed is so deviant from the truth that even cross-worshipping Christians for ages considered them [Yazidis] devil worshippers and Satanists, as is recorded in accounts of Westerners and Orientalists who encountered them or studied them. It is ultimately ironic that Obama sites these devil worshippers as the main cause for his intervention in Iraq and Sham, as he sides with the Peshmerga—gangs of mercenaries related to the Marxist PUK and allied with the Marxist PKK—a 'terrorist' organization according to the taghut laws the West 'believes' in. (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015b, Issue 4, p. 14)

The difference in belief here as a reason to be killed, as mentioned earlier in the article, is key to understanding the biopolitical caesura that IS aims to produce. In this excerpt alone five ideological enemies of IS are named. Within the broader spectrum of the article, which is concerned with slavery, we also begin to see extended rationalisations through references to scholars' interpretations of hadith to justify slavery. It should be noted that this is one of the most significant characteristics of IS media; the specific use and selection of historically located Islamist hermeneutics to buttress IS's worldview. This article is chiefly concerned with Yazidis who, the author claims, and according to hadith, do not come under the same category as Christians and Jews who are allowed to live in the caliphate if they pay jizya, a religious tax (Sourdel & Sourdel-Thomine 2007, p. 85). The Yazidis, who are categorised as mushrikin, 'someone guilty of "shirk"' (Sourdel & Sourdel-Thomine 2007, p. 121), can be taken as slaves:

After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shari'ah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State's authority to be divided as khums. (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015b, Issue 4, p. 15)

This article, and the quotation in particular, serve as an instruction of who to kill—in this instance I use the word ‘kill’ in the Foucauldian sense, to expose to death rather than to directly murder (Foucault 2003, p. 256). The article also takes part in a pedagogy of how to treat particular subjects: Yazidis can be slaves and Christians and Jews can pay jizya, however, anyone who does not conduct themselves correctly can be literally killed. By discussing examples of who IS claim it is acceptable to enslave, we begin to develop a deeper insight into whose body will be used as a trophy whether through the removal of life or the public marking of the body.

It is worth taking this opportunity to anchor *Dabiq* as discursively constituting the Islamic State’s dispositif of terror. Of the examples discussed in *Dabiq* so far, we can begin to see how IS’s dispositif was partially organised through the re-constitution of power. That is, artefacts like *Dabiq* are part of a ‘heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. *The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements*’ (Agamben, 2009, pp. 2-3; emphasis mine). As a text, *Dabiq* both complies with and extends this list of categorisations: it is both discursive and an institution in that it seeks to produce subjectivities through the deployment of power/knowledge(s) and specific re-constitutions of power; it is law in its capacity to instruct subjects on correct conduct in the pursuit of healthy bodies and therefore healthy souls; it is a police measure through its visceral depiction of punishment for incorrect conduct that buttresses and spreads disciplinary power; it holds the philosophical propositions of scholars that concede a heterogeneous set of governmental strategies which re-appropriate religious interpretation through a claim to objectivity. It is, as Agamben states, a ‘set of institutions, of processes of subjectification, and of rules in which power relations become concrete’ (2009, p. 6). Accounting for an apparatus as cohering a ‘set of practices and mechanisms’ (2009, p. 8) aimed at producing power, it is possible to say that the network-apparatus that exists between technologies of power and institutional measures is a multiplicity of media flows that attempt to produce particular subjectivities. As an official publication of IS, *Dabiq* aims to produce such subjectivities.

So far, convergences of power have been shown to permeate *Dabiq*. At the base of such conjunctions is pedagogy of cultural biopolitics. *Dabiq* aims to teach the populace how to conduct itself. This occurs through techniques such as zakat which care for the flock only if they are correctly performing subjects. It also ensues through direct instruction of how to conduct oneself on an individual basis such as the example in ‘Advice for the Soldiers of the Islamic State’ (Al-Hayat Media Center, *Dabiq*, 2015c, Issue 6, p. 8), and through images of punishment and trophy bodies that instruct who it is permissible to exclude, punish, and kill. The magazine is also an outlet that informs subjects external to the caliphate how to conduct themselves, whether on arrival in the Islamic State or merely in their home countries if they

cannot perform hijrah. In IS's current state, it is important to note this distinction as the dream of the caliphate faces more deterioration and uncertainty every day. Responses to this materialise in more recent media such as the *Inside the Islamic State* series which focuses on specific ways of conducting terror abroad rather than the growth of the caliphate, a pattern that is also reflected in IS's current magazine, *Rumiyah* (Wignell et al. 2017, p. 17). What is also apparent, however, is the constitutive relationship between technologies of power in the governmentality of the caliphate.

Dabiq is a text which helps to constitute IS's apparatuses itself. Through its pursuit of the regulation of conduct, it adheres to Agamben's functional usage of the term: 'anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings' (2009, p. 14). Simultaneously, it is the network established between technologies of power, discourses, institutions, subjectivities, epistemologies and so on. By seeking to produce subjectivities, it becomes a part of IS's dispositif inasmuch as it serves as a networked interlocutor that lies between IS and potential citizens and soldiers. In turn, there is the potential for those produced subjects to construct their own media to reinforce the caliphate.

The Prosumed Extension of Power in IS Blogs

The now defunct Tumblr account PaladinOfJihad is a prosumed terror apparatus that operates from an IS episteme and seeks to both facilitate hijrah and regularise audiences. Tumblr blogs can be considered as a prosumed extension of power: that is, PaladinOfJihad's blog is an example of media that is both consumed insofar as it addresses audiences through advisory and pedagogical posts, and produced by IS supporters through followers' questions that incite content creation by the owner. In this case, much of the information considered in this blog has to take into account the prosumed nature of this IS's specific terror apparatus. Put differently, the themes that emerge from the content in this blog are framed within a broader social episteme of IS's apparatus of terror. As an example, the final post in the #DustyFeet series is not concerned with daily conduct within the caliphate or otherwise, rather, its concerns are practical and part of an overall strategy to facilitate hijrah by framing it as a bio-pastoral enactment of conduct. PaladinOfJihad states that a key goal of the blog is to initiate his audience into being 'productive members of this Ummah'. Although each post has a different function, they are largely concerned with teaching 'good' Muslim conduct. A prime focus of this section is the role of social media to educate subjects on how to perform hijrah, that for IS, simultaneously becomes a biopolitical act as it fosters the health of the caliphate's population on one hand, and adheres to both pastoral and disciplinary compliance in its capacity as a religious duty on the other. In previous years IS and their supporters had a significant presence on mainstream social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, and YouTube. However, due to the

obviously militant nature that their content embodied, social media companies have endeavoured to remove such accounts (Yadron 2016) although some remain online (Fitalnoosham97.tumblr.com, 2016; 2016, حمزهb4434h6336d.tumblr.com, 2016; Salauddin499.tumblr.com, 2016), a lot of the more famous or popular accounts have not been uploaded to in some time. PaladinOfJihad's Tumblr account was one such significant account that has been removed and is now only accessible via archive.org. The following section offers an analysis of PaladinOfJihad's series #DustyFeet in terms of hijrah and a presumed extension of power.

It is first worth noting the significance of the title, #DustyFeet is closely tied to conduct and pastoral power. For IS, in order to be accepted by Allah, subjects must reside or seek to reside in the caliphate and perform correct Islamic conduct once they are there. To have dusty feet is to be present in the caliphate despite its sometimes harsh conditions. However, having dusty feet also connotes the struggles one will face on the path to Allah and tawhid: there is a circuit here in that the meaning of #DustyFeet lies in physical conduct that fosters the health of the soul. With regard to the health of souls, to have dusty feet from physical adherence to Islamic conduct via hijrah is an act that is intrinsically connected to a biopolitics of the soul. I note the stakes of naming a series of blog posts that discuss sincere Islamic conduct and technical aspects of hijrah in order to frame the following analysis.

#DustyFeet

The #DustyFeet series is primarily composed of six text posts that address different areas of conduct yet are all connected to an overall process of subjectification: 'Part 1: Know Your Strengths and Weaknesses' and 'Part 2: Like a Feather' are personal strengths and sincerity; 'Part 3: Outdoor Inconveniences' and 'Part 4: Your Body is Your Gym' are respectively concerned with health and disciplining the body; and 'Part 5: What to Pack & Why' and 'Part 6: Issues about Turkey' are directly concerned with the technical aspects of hijrah.

Parts 1 and 2 of #DustyFeet instruct subjects how to conduct themselves as better Muslims and are noteworthy for their suggestion of personal self-improvement as part of good Islamic conduct. In Part 1, subjects are told to write down their strengths and weaknesses and to address their weaknesses directly so that Allah might be more partial to them. For IS, favourable subjects are strong and not weak, both in their physicality and belief. Although this post is mostly vague, however, it is significant to note it as the beginning of a wholly presumed knowledge object. That is, this is an example of an IS subject taking it on himself to attempt to produce more subjects by composing a knowledge object that emerges from a specific Islamic episteme. Further, the uptake of presumed social media that teaches rather than enforces further accounts for the productive elements of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower. PaladinOfJihad's #DustyFeet series is the extension of power: it is a produced discourse in its re-

constitution of specific modes of power, in its attempted production of and participation in an episteme, in its multimodal delivery, and also in its previous capacity to be disseminated horizontally through a variety of other blogs. The next five posts in this series extend and elaborate on specific examples of these elements.

The second #DustyFeet post titled 'Like a Feather', is primarily about 'intention' or sincerity and is heralded as 'the most important part of the #DustyFeet series.' For the author, 'intention' is inherently connected to the production of a healthy soul, and in this post, pertains to what subjects' rationale is for their conduct. The two criteria for the sincerity of conduct are that 'the deed must be done purely for the sake of Allah' and that 'it must be according to the Sunnah of the Prophet'. This post constitutes an attempt to regularise subjects. It addresses broadly the possibility of authentic or fraudulent Islamic conduct through the framing of two kinds of jihad. Authentic conduct that is accepted by Allah is concerned with divine gratification and obedience to the amir: 'He treated his companions kindly and abstained from mischief. The sleeping and waking up of such a person are all rewarded'. The second, fraudulent enactment of jihad (and therefore Islamic conduct) is concerned with a will to personal gratification:

He who fought with the intention of pride, showing-off and to gain popularity ... he disobeyed the amir and spread mischief in the land. Such a person returns from the jihad with no reward whatsoever. (PaladinOfJihad 2016)

These two quotations are translations from hadith though their meanings have been re-appropriated to connect jihad, or a struggle against non-believers, as an obligatory part of Islamic conduct. Although jihad has multiple interpretations, IS employ the term within its discursive construction that instigates violence against non-believers or kafir. This incitement to violence, within the scope of prosumed terror apparatuses, is often directed to kafir outside the caliphate. Certainly, due to the nature of #DustyFeet as a tool that delivers advice on hijrah, the plea to divine sincerity in the excerpt above is connected to enacting violence on both those kafir inside and outside the caliphate.

Parts 3 and 4 of the #DustyFeet series deploy more overt intersections of pastoral power, disciplinary power, and biopower. 'Outdoor Inconveniences' is primarily about the difference between more 'luxurious' plumbing and the sometimes limited bathroom facilities of the caliphate as well as wudu or ritual washing. This post connects the biopolitical issue of hygiene with the pastoral conduct of subjects. The author deploys biopower by instructing his audience to learn to squat should they ever need to relieve themselves outdoors while in the caliphate. He further suggests to practice cleaning oneself with a variety of objects:

Next progression level is to use rocks, leaves, straw, or anything that's permissible to use by *shari'a* (bones and dung are not

permissible) and to specially avoid using any 'luxuries' such as wet wipes and tissue/toilet paper and water. (PaladinOfJihad, 2016)

Here, the biopolitically counterintuitive prompt to clean oneself with natural objects operates from a variety of perspectives. This is a rupture in the deployment of IS biopower and accounts for the prosumed nature of the blog. In other words, this post is an example of the extension of power through an IS produced subject that is informed by the will to have 'dusty feet'. For PaladinOfJihad, the goal of preparing subjects for life in the caliphate is an exertion of power that attempts to link physical conduct and correct cleanliness with transcendental hygiene. In the pursuit of tawhid, to have dusty feet is to also be properly clean yet not cleaned with the wrong object.

Although they are mostly concerned with the practical issues of migration, #DustyFeet Parts 5 and 6 also negotiate with religious law and secular rules in the performance of hijrah. The author quotes a hadith to highlight how one should travel lightly to the caliphate: 'Be, in this world, as a passer-by'. The rest of Part 5 primarily outlines practical issues of travelling to the caliphate. It is mainly composed of vast lists of specific items ranging from toiletries and insoles to multi-tools and fixed blades. These lists reveal the extent to which the act of hijrah exists within a biopolitical and pastoral circuit of conduct: the production of a healthy caliphate population is dependent on the bodily conduct involved in navigating airports and borders to enter the caliphate. Such navigation, due to Orientalist discourses which have and continue to construct Islamic dress, Arabic language, and non-white bodies as synonymous with terror and violence, and which seek to regularise 'abnormal' bodies, must be enacted in certain ways. Correct Islamic conduct then, in the pursuit of hijrah, may be temporarily suspended for the greater goals of the caliphate. As an example, one must be inconspicuous so as not to draw attention to themselves in airports and other liminal spaces. These subjects then seek to avoid the racialised geocorpographies of airport spaces that Kamaloni (2016) draws attention to which I have noted above:

Some brothers I know shaved or shortened their beards. I've heard of some sisters who took off their niqāb. Some adopt another style of dressing. I won't get into the permissibility of doing all those because this is upon you to research about what is *halāl* or *harām* and to determine to which degree you want to blend in. May Allah help you because this is not something light and easy. To lift your niqāb or shorten your beard is not easy. *Subhān Allah*. All in all, you shouldn't give out the impression or the 'vibe' that you're making hijra. (PaladinOfJihad, 2016)

The author dances around the permissibility of temporarily suspending corporeal conduct that is fundamental to the salvation of the soul. Not stated directly in order to avoid any encouragement of deviating from the flock's mentality and conduct, it is nevertheless implicit in this excerpt that briefly deviating from the preferred conduct of a good Muslim is permissible in order to commit hijrah. This temporary

deficiency is then framed as a vaccination: minor exposure to illness for protection in the future. The prosumed knowledge object of the blog can be said to regulate corporeality in the pursuit of an immunised and healthy soul. Although 'compromises should be kept to a minimum' (PaladinOfJihad, 2014), inoculation via exposure to incorrect conduct serves the overall goals of IS: to cultivate a functional and benevolent Islamic State.

Conclusion

In the case of IS, what is largely found is a biopolitics of cultural conduct which subsumes disciplinary and pastoral techniques of power into the group's apparatus of terror. The quest for sovereignty over minds, lands, and bodies is pursued by IS not just via the corporeal removal of life from subjects, but also through the attempt to subordinate populations and subjects via the regularisation of life's potential. As shown above through an analysis of video, text, and digital media, there is a sturdy deployment of cultural biopolitics to not only regularise the citizens of IS, but those external to the caliphate across IS media directed towards English-speakers. This does not specifically occur in the way that Blencowe (2011) has discussed cultural biopolitics. Instead, my claim is that in the case of IS, constellations of multiple technologies of power, sometimes in unison and sometimes alone, constitute a mode of cultural biopolitics where one's conduct is plotted on the axes of inclusion and exclusion.

In this article, I have analysed three kinds of media that are characteristic of IS's mediascape. Firstly, I examined the biopolitical function of officially produced videos and the extent to which they teach subjects who can be excluded or killed. Such videos are informed by an IS episteme that constitutes which abnormal subjects can become objects of knowledge. Such videos can also be seen to impart governmental knowledge of how one should conduct themselves so that their corporeal and transcendental health is accounted for. Secondly, I considered the re-constitution of specific technologies of power that converge in certain instances in the officially produced IS magazine, *Dabiq*. This observation is significant as it accounts for the effectiveness of texts in IS's apparatus of terror. The convergence of power is most prevalent in *Dabiq* when compared with other media analysed in this article, though it is certainly not unique to the magazine. It should also be noted that like videos produced by IS, *Dabiq*, is an effective means of deploying epistemic authority. In other words, *And No Respite* and *The End of Sykes-Picot*, alongside *Dabiq*, have the privilege of being officially produced by IS and therefore circulate this expertise for future subjects. Thirdly, I analysed the blog series #DustyFeet produced by PaladinOfJihad. Examining a blog reveals the extent to which social media platforms can facilitate an extension of power. That is, social media's capacity for prosumership extends the capacity to exert technologies of power in ways traditional media is limited by. The deployment of power is then extended by the preferred subjectivities of IS rather than by official media production companies.

As stated, one of the primary concerns of the #DustyFeet series is to teach subjects how to perform hijrah to produce a healthy caliphate, even if this means the temporary suspension of preferred conduct.

This article has sought to reveal how IS media deploys techniques of power and shows how power was exerted within the caliphate. An analysis of power in IS media allows a window into the governance of the caliphate through its revelation of the logic behind the caliphate's governmentality and the epistemes at work that inform their media practices. Pulsing from and through social epistemes, technologies of power amalgamate and complement one another to bolster the efficacy of terror apparatuses in their aim to conduct those subjects both inside and outside the Islamic State, to regularise corporeal and transcendental health, and to inform what can be counted as valid knowledge.

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Notes

ⁱ It seems as though the exploded building is the one that the prisoners are housed in. However, this is not explicitly stated and the idea of suggesting death rather than a spectacular portrayal is incongruent with IS's overall production of media.

ⁱⁱ It should be noted that there is some scholarly debate around whether Foucault means Protestantism or Catholicism when he says 'Christianity'. It is outside the scope of this article to address this issue in any great detail but my uptake of pastoral power understands 'Christianity' as referring to Abrahamic religions. What is most important about pastoral power, no matter how and where it is used, is the care for the flock by a shepherd, as well as the salvation of each individual, which seems to carry across a great many religions.

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