

○ VOLUME 17 NUMBER 2, 2018

Introduction

## Migration and Mobility Politics

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When we consider migration, mobility politics and unprecedented levels of refugees worldwide, it is crucial to locate the cause of the problem within the catastrophic consequences of global capitalism and with the Western industrial/military interventions that enable and enforce capitalism's agenda. In a globalised market economy, commodities circulate freely, but not people. Capitalist globalisation is inherently contradictory, it needs access to a mobile labour force but it must also restrict movement because it cannot afford the same rights and the same freedoms for all people. Slavoj Žižek contends that, 'capitalist globalization stands not only for openness and conquest, but also for the idea of a self-enclosed globe separating its privileged Inside from its Outside' (2016, p. 7). These two aspects of global capitalism are inextricably linked. However, the now constant flow of refugees, for us insiders, appears mostly on TV and in media reports, not as part of our everyday reality. That's why, as Žižek claims, 'it is our duty to become fully aware of the brutal violence that pervades the world outside our protected environment' (2016, p. 8). At stake here is burgeoning middle-class subjectivity, the reinvention of parameters of state citizenship according to an international culture of consumption and the normalisation of social deprivation both within and across nation-states.

Although increased movements of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants foreground the irreducibility of culture to national origin and territory, the nation-state remains the ultimate arbiter of both cultural identity and political citizenship. Outsiders and newcomers are considered as Others, as inherently unpatriotic and as a potential threat to national security. Through the power of reiterative discourse the terms 'economic migrants', 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees' actually operate to produce the effect that they name. These terms demonstrate how political economy and social context formulate seemingly incontestable referents that are discursively constructed expressions of power. The same principle applies to the term 'indigeneity'. The articles in this issue highlight the deployment of those exclusionary tactics that

inform national narratives and that mark Other as socially undesirable and threatening and that, as Ghassan Hage claims, 'encourage the general public to make a causal link between criminality, poverty and racial or ethnic identity' (2003, p. 20). It is the causal link between displaced, disenfranchised people and the devastating impact of global capitalism that reiterative, racialised and class-based narratives work to mask and disavow.

In his article on international transracial adoption in Sweden, Richie Wyver highlights the contradictions at play when adoptees are sought after as 'different' while, at the same time, that 'difference' is strongly disavowed. That is to say, the adoptees are raised by white Swedish parents in a discursively constructed social context of 'colour-blindness' and 'post-racial nationhood. Wyvers utilises Bhabha's notion of 'mimicry' to examine the processes by which adoptees are 'condemned to constant negotiation and renegotiation of their split identity, as they spin between being almost the same but not quite, to almost different but not quite' (this issue). Wyver's study reveals that although racism is a strong theme running through all adoptee accounts, racism is usually 'positioned elsewhere' in an 'immigrant as racist' narrative which then enables the adoptee to align with the prevailing (white) Swedish colour-blind, post-racial myth (this issue).

Whiteness, in narrations of national identity, refers not only to skin colour but to historically and discursively constructed expressions of power. Whiteness is far from being an essentialized, fixed racial category and refers, instead, to 'the dominant North European tradition of domination over "Third World-looking people"' (Hage 1998, p. 59). As Hage explains, 'whiteness' has its roots in the history of European colonisation when white identity was established in the position of cultural power at the same time that the colonised were in the process of being racialised. Whiteness emerged in opposition to Blackness/Brownness and alongside other binary oppositions, such as developed/underdeveloped and First World/Third World (1998, p. 58). Contemporary articulations of national or cultural identity reanimate some of the 'neat, middle-class aesthetic fantasies' that, as Hage sees it, 'were, and still are, part and parcel of traditional colonial racism' (2003, p. 111). According to Hage, the main feature of colonial or developmental racism is the presumption that 'your cultural or racial identity is your essence', and that 'European Whiteness' is always imbued with 'superior values and superior capacities' (2003, p. 111-112). As Hage argues, colonial racism's implicit message is that if you have not created societies that are advanced (in a capitalist sense), this has more to do with your 'essential character' as non-White people than with the socio-historical and ecological conditions of social development (2003, p. 112). Hage explains that class is intrinsically connected to developmental racism because racists construct an aesthetics of "self" which is itself achieved 'through a middle-class image-based aestheticisation of the 'group' one claims to belong to' (2003, p. 112). It is also this version of the nation-state, more than any of its predecessors, that 'has no room for marginals' (2003, p. 20).

Hage's writing focuses on the fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society but, as an Australian, he also highlights 'the problematic representation of Aboriginality within White fantasies' (1998, p. 24). Hage acknowledges an institutionalised division of labour between academics interested in 'multiculturalism' and those interested in 'Aboriginality' and believes this situation arises from a White governmental tendency to treat 'White-Aboriginal' relations and 'Anglo-Ethnic' relations as 'two separate spheres of life' (1998, p. 24). For Hage, Aboriginal Blackness is constructed within relations of power which only allow 'functional and passive belonging' (1998, p. 57). Furthermore, these power relations work to situate Blackness as a 'marker' against which all those who are neither black nor white, skin-colour wise, can 'use the Blackness of the Aboriginal people to emphasise their non-Blackness' and hence their capacity to enter the field of Whiteness. Of course, as Hage argues, such a definite Black-White divide also works to give Whiteness a solidity it does not really have (1998, p. 57).

Several of the authors in this issue utilise the work of Michel Foucault who argues that racism 'is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control' and that racism is endemic to the modern nation-state (2004, p. 254). Steven Farry's article offers a close analysis of friction between those defined in terms of Aboriginal Blackness and 'passive belonging' and those defined by the White Supremacy myth that construes Indigenous people as always requiring paternalistic management. Farry links Alexis Wright's *Grog War* and an Aboriginal-led initiative to reduce alcohol consumption with Foucault's analysis of state racism and logic of security that divides populations according to who must be made live and who will be let die. As Farry explains, 'A security mechanism allows the raced other to be administered and let die in ways that maximise their beneficial effects and minimise (or compensate for) their alleged detrimental effects on the population's health and wellbeing (this issue). Although the Indigenous people of Australia are accepted as citizens within the national imaginary, as opposed to many 'economic migrants', 'asylum seekers' or 'refugees', exclusionary tactics continue to mark them as Other, as outside the White dominion that informs the government.

Fabiane Ramos approaches the topic of refugees and the global refugee crisis by seeking the perspectives of those who have settled in Australia as refugees themselves. Ramos aims to highlight the viewpoints of 'people as knowers in their own lives', thus challenging notions around who the knowers are in research and, more specifically, 'who the knowers are within refugee crisis discourses' (this issue). Ramos situates her research in both historical and contemporary context, reminding us of the impacts of colonial legacies and noting that 2015 saw the highest ever number of displaced people worldwide, refugees and asylum-seekers. Ramos conducts a series of 'conversations' with four young Australian refugees. Conversations and poetry converge to offer insights from those who are often denied agency. Alejandra, a refugee from El Salvador now living in Brisbane, offers one such example. She states: 'I'm not saying that it doesn't take

a lot of good economic planning to house these people, I'm not saying that's not included, but I don't see why that is seen as the bigger issue than what people (refugees) have been through' (this issue).

Mahmoud Kesharvarz and Eric Snodgrass take the politics of displaced peoples out of nation-state context and into the space of the Mediterranean Sea. They cite Heller & Pezzani who describe the liquid territory of the sea as 'the absolute challenge to spatial analysis' and whose research attempts 'to document the deaths of migrants at sea and violations of their rights' (2014 p. 657 & 658). As Heller & Pezzani explain, 'While between 1988 and November 2012 the press and NGOs reported more than 14,000 deaths at the maritime frontier of the EU—including more than 7,000 in the Sicily Channel alone—the conditions in which these occur have rarely been established with precision and the responsibility for them has seldom been determined' (2014, p. 657). Kesharvarz and Snodgrass build on such research to focus on the role of boats, especially the presence and movement of 'unseaworthy boats', to highlight the forms of migration politics that have been employed to make the Mediterranean 'a space of European control' (this issue). They point out, for example, how 'there is a racism embedded in specific practices of mobility regimes (e.g. visa policies and passport validity) that make certain bodies on the move subject to more inspection, checks and control and thus subject to European gaze' (this issue). In addition, 'any white body on the move within the space of Europe is always already assumed to be a legal traveller and any non-white body on the move potentially an 'illegal' traveler' (this issue). Regarding the mobility regimes presently in place in the Mediterranean Sea, Kesharvarz and Snodgrass conclude that 'Europe can then—whether in an active mode of enforcement or passive mode of inaction—be seen to apply selectively uneven, plastic and asymmetric forms of control' (this issue).

In his analysis of the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) caliphate, Lewis Rarm links Foucault's concepts of biopower and governmentality to argue that the IS employs biopolitical and cultural processes to cultivate subjects. Rarm explains that while there has been a focus on the use of IS media as propaganda, it's important to consider the modes of governmentality that guide the daily conduct of subjects, whether internal citizens or external supporters. As deployed by the IS, cultural biopolitics 'places the soul at stake in the conduct of the body' (this issue). Utilizing Joseph Pugliese's notion of 'geocorpography', Rarm explains how the IS 'dissolve geographical borders' and 'simultaneously seek to bolster borders of the body that inform a binary of normal and abnormal' (this issue). Rarm presents an in-depth analysis of two key IS videos, as well as other IS texts and digital media to demonstrate the biopolitical production of subjects as either those who can be 'made to live' or those who can be 'let die' (this issue). According to Foucault, 'once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State' (2004, p. 256). As Farry points out in his article (this issue), when Foucault refers to 'killing', he does not mean only actual murder, but also every indirect form of murder, including increasing the risk of death for some people,

and 'political death, expulsion, rejection and so on' (2004, p. 256). For Foucault, racism has two functions. The first function is 'to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower' (2004, p. 255). The second function is to legitimate the relationship of war: 'In order to live, you must destroy your enemies' (2004, p. 255). In this way, war is made quite compatible with the exercise of biopolitical control and war, or the threat of war, is used to justify racism and totalitarian rule. In other words, disciplinary, regulatory and pastoral forms of biopower co-exist and interact in micro and macro formulations of governmentality to inform the biopolitical management of life itself. The IS governs to maximise both the health of the body and the fate of the soul and, as Rarm points out, teaching correct daily conduct involves interwoven enactments 'of pastoral power, disciplinary power and biopower' (this issue). Those who deviate and fail to perform correctly are either rehabilitated or marked for death by the 'terror apparatuses' underpinning modes of governmentality in the Islamic State. Although it might be claimed that Islam resists global capitalism and that any reservations we might have about it should, therefore, be tactically overlooked, Žižek thinks differently and claims such a premise should be 'unequivocally rejected' (2016, p. 25). He argues that the most Islam can offer, even in its 'moderate' version, is yet another 'alternative modernity', and so 'a vision of capitalism without its antagonisms, which cannot but resemble Fascism' (2016, p. 25). Modern nation-states are struggling to secure territory, citizens and economies against growing transnational flows of people, capital, religions and cultural alterity. Any decision by nation-states to accept economic migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers is measured against perceived threats to socio-political stability and the nation-state's ability to attract potential international creditors and investors.

Borders operate to limit people's movements and eventually to frame the imaginary space of their aspirations. That is to say, borders work as much to control people's fantasies of a viable life as much as they work to control and regulate population flows between nation-states (Hage 2017, p. 38). However, as Hage claims, what may not be so readily apparent is the fact that there are two types of borders: the first separates different nation-states, the second is a racialised class border, which separates two different experiences of mobility in the world today (Hage 2017, p. 39). Hage is endorsing here what Žižek (2016) describes as the two aspects of contemporary global capitalism. As a 'global apartheid structure', these racialised class borders delineate very separate realities, contrasting worlds that are co-existing within the same global space. In one reality, the largely White upper classes move seamlessly across borders, experiencing the world as almost borderless. Hage cites Wendy Brown (2010) to describe such mobility in terms 'of increased spatial openness and fusion accompanied by a proliferation of protective walls' (2017, p. 39). In the other reality, borders are always important, uniformly intimidating and usually exceptionally difficult to cross. The 'third-world-looking' transnational working-class and underclass travellers face a barrage of visas, checkpoints, searches, queues, immigration bureaucracies and

fences, set up to serve both as deterrents and as forms of control. As Hage puts it, 'some are the subjects of the global order, others are its objects, often circulating strictly according to the needs of capital' (2017, pp. 39-40). As national borders come under increasing pressure from both internal and external crises, the class/apartheid border system works to secure a borderless world for the economically affluent while denying mobility or agency to the disenfranchised. The contributors to this issue of borderlands address some of the problems facing those who, for multiple reasons and to varying degrees, must contend with the apartheid system and racialised class barriers presently informing global order.

As always, we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, the authors for their contributions and our readership for their continued support.

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